The inability to pass protect is killing the 2009 Packers. While this was not entirely unexpected, no-one imagined it would be this awful. An examination of the three sacks from the first half of the Vikings game — while Colledge was still in at left tackle — shows that there is plenty of blame to go around. The linemen are struggling both individually and as a unit, with technique and with assignment; Rodgers is trying to do too much rather than take what the defense gives him; and the sideline is not helping with playcalling and lack of adjustment. (I only have the TV angle to go on, so it's impossible to say whether the receivers are doing their bit by failing to get separation, too.)
All three of the first-half sacks occurred with the Vikings rushing only four. On the game's first drive, Green Bay had advanced to the Minnesota 25 on eight plays (six passes, two runs, plus two penalties). On first-and-10, the Packers lined up with two receivers either side, Rodgers under center, and a running back (Grant?) deep. Minnesota bunched the Mike and Will linebackers together on the weakside, as if to threaten an extra rusher, but both LBs would ultimately drop into coverage.
The play started badly for the Pack when LDT Pat Williams got a lightning quick start. His precipitation forced the Packers to double-team him with C Wells and RG Sitton. Grant did not stay back to protect; he darted across the line in anticipation of a middle-screen, leaving the three remaining linemen one-on-one with the Vikings defensive line. That was a mismatch. Both tackles failed miserably. RT Allen Barbre raised his hands, and got swiped by LDE Robison, leaving Robison with a clear outside route to the quarterback. LT Daryn Colledge for some reason dived at RDE Jared Allen's legs, but missed and ended up on his back with his legs in the air, like a doomed insect. To add insult to ignominy, LG Jason Spitz lost his man too, although by the time Kevin Williams had rumbled past him the play was over.
This was the worst protection that Rodgers would have in the first half. He barely had time to set his feet before he saw Robison looming. However, Rodgers compounded the situation by turning away from Robison. Not only did he take his eyes off the pressure, but he also lost sight of the play as it developed downfield. It is hard to tell from the TV angle, but Grant appeared to be open over the middle and three of the four receivers were now out of Rodgers' field of vision. Perhaps Rodgers was hoping to run, but he would have been better advised to throw the ball away or even take Robison's sack. Instead he ran into Allen and lost the football.
Sack #2 happened on the first play of the second quarter, score 7-7, after the Vikings had gone three-and-out, giving Green Bay excellent field position. It was first-and-10 on the third play of the drive, with the Packers lined up in the I, preparing play-action. The play was designed to look like a run to the right with LG Spitz and RG Sitton pulling up front, leaving Rodgers with room to spin out left and look downfield. The Vikings were in a curious formation for a running down: both DEs were lined up wide, the LDE over TE Jermichael Finley, the RDE a yard or two outside of LT Colledge, and the Sam and Mike linebackers bunched together in the middle. Clearly the Packers' between-the-tackles running game doesn't command much respect: the Williams twins were on their own here. If ever there was a case for an audible, here it was.
This time the Packers chose to double-team Kevin Williams, using Wells and Colledge to smash him into inactivity. That left FB John Kuhn to pick up the RDE, which he did very effectively. The problems arose on the other side of the field, where the Vikings' LDE span wide on a run blitz. One of the pulling guards was charged with pursuing him, but it's not clear which one, as they both raced outside to block him. They were quickly joined by RB Ryan Grant after the play action: three Packers blocking one Viking. Inevitably that left Barbre one-one-one with Pat Williams, and Barbre got manhandled, swiped out of the way. Williams then began chugging towards Rodgers as the play-action unfolded.
Having spotted Williams, Rodgers rolled out left, keeping his eyes downfield. He failed to see strong-side linebacker Ben Leber, who had not pursued the run, leaving only open ground between him and Rodgers. The Packer QB was sacked before he had time to think about throwing. Who was supposed to account for the linebackers on the play? The weakside LB took himself out by playing the run; the middle LB dropped into coverage. What about Leber? To my eyes, the Packers should have audibled out of the play (or called a timeout).
The third sack came on third-and-5, on the third play of a drive which began at the Packer 25. Again the Packers had four receivers, with Jennings in motion to create a trips set on the right. Rodgers was in the shotgun with DeShawn Wynn at halfback to his left. The Vikings again set their DEs wide, outside the tackles, with the RDT over left tackle and the LDT in the gap between RG Sitton and RT Barbre. The linebackers were in a flat V and the secondary showed zone coverage.
Again the Packers assigned two blockers — Wells and Spitz — to RDT Kevin Williams. With Williams taken care of, Wells then pulled away to look for a linebacker to block. But there was none: Minnesota had dropped seven into coverage, and was banking on its linemen being able to get pressure by themselves. Wynn lingered a while to see if Colledge needed help one-on-one with RDE Allen, but Colledge seemed to be holding up, so Wynn chose instead to run diagonally toward the left touchline, where he appeared to be open.
By now, the right-hand side of the pocket was in trouble. Both rushers were out wide and on the point of overcoming their blocker. Rodgers noticed this and had to make a quick decision. Either he could dump the pass off to Wynn, or he could advance in the pocket, in a bid to scramble or set up for a downfield throw. Unfortunately he made the wrong choice. He pumped uselessly in the direction of Wynn — hoping to give himself running space in front of the linebackers? — and then tried to squeeze between the swarming rushers, Pat Williams to his right and Jared Allen to his left. But by this time Allen had defeated Colledge: having motioned inside, Allen dropped his hands, got a push on Colledge's upper body, and went around the outside. Rodgers misjudged the space that was available to him, as Allen was able to get a full stretch and bring Rodgers down.
Rodgers didn't have a load of time — the sack happened inside three seconds — but he did have space: it was a five-step drop out of the shotgun. Wynn and one other receiver (playing from the left slot) appeared to be open when he pumped, and both could have made five yards for a first down. If Wynn was not a receiving option, he should have stayed back to help block Allen. As it was, he was utterly superfluous.
In conclusion, these examples show that the Packers' protection issues are not the result of one single correctable weakness. There is plenty of blame to be shared by plenty of individuals. McCarthy responded to his players' request to play less max-protect, but Rodgers did not show great awareness of the protection breakdowns around him, and remained reluctant to check down under pressure. Using only five blockers on a line as talented as Minnesota's — and failing to adapt to Leslie Frazier's strategy of spreading out his defensive linemen — meant that the Packers' tackles were frequently left one-on-one with the Viking ends, and they could not cope, compounding the mismatches with poor technique and assignment errors. On top of all that, the Vikings showed no respect for the Packers' running game, especially between the tackles; they basically willed the Pack to run on them, yet McCarthy called 13 passes and 6 runs in the first half (excluding the final drive) despite giving up three sacks and an interception.